Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 30
Issue 4 Issue 4 - May 1977

Article 3

5-1977

Tying Arrangements and the Individual Coercion Doctrine
W. Perry Brandt

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons

Recommended Citation
W. Perry Brandt, Tying Arrangements and the Individual Coercion Doctrine, 30 Vanderbilt Law Review 755
(1977)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol30/iss4/3

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information,
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

NOTES
Tying Arrangements and the
Individual Coercion Doctrine
I.
II.

III.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
...
......
INTRODUCTION
THE ELEMENTS OF TYING LAW ........
DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL COERCION
DOCTRINE
.759

755
756

A. Establishment of a Coercion Requirement
B. The Significance of an Individual Coercion Requirement ............................
..
C. Genesis of the Individual Coercion Doctrine ....
D. Subsequent Development ..................
(1) The Nature of Coercion
(2) Form of the Tying Arrangement
(3) . Uniformity of the Tying Arrangement ...
(4) Conspiracy or Policy to Tie ...........
(5) Acceptance of the Tying Arrangement
(6)
IV.

UNGAR

Summary

v.

....

.......
............

B. Response to the Distiict Court Decision
...
C. The Court of Appeals Decision
D. Response to the Court of Appeals Decision
V.

LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE DOCTRINE

A.
B.
C.
D.
VI.
VII.

.
.

I.

......
..

780
782
782
783

...........

Precedential Support for the Doctrine .......
.
The Effect of Perma Life Mufflers .....
The Effect of Texaco ....................
..
The Use of Economic Power . .....

POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE DOCTRINE
CONCLUSION ....
.....

763
765
767
768
769
771
773
775
776
776
778

DUNKIN' DONUTS OF AMERICA, INC ...

A. The DistrictCourt Decision ...

759

.....
....

783
786
787
788
790
794

IzNTRODUCTION

The validity of tying arrangements has been considered often
by the courts and commentators.' In developing the law of tying, the
1. See, e.g., Austin, The Tying Arrangement: A Critique and Some New Thoughts, 1967
Wis. L. REv. 88; McCarthy, Trademark Franchisingand Antitrust: The Trouble with Tieins, 58 CALIF. L. REv. 1085 (1970); Pearson, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Policy, 60 Nw.
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Supreme Court has enumerated several explicit prerequisites to the
establishment of an illegal tie. In recent years, however, a number
of lower courts have formulated an additional requirement that
"'coercion" influence a purchaser's acquiescence in a tie-in. Subsequent courts have elaborated on this standard in the class action
context by requiring that this coercion be proved individually. This
corollary, known as the Individual Coercion Doctrine, in most cases
operates to deny class certification because individual proof of coercion creates a predominance of individual questions of law and fact
contrary to rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Although
the parameters of the Doctrine are unclear in some respects, it has
gained wide acceptance in the federal courts. Nevertheless, the legal
and policy bases of the Doctrine were cast into doubt when it was
rejected expressly by the district court in Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts
of America, Inc.,' which found that coercion is not a necessary element of tying law. Although reversal of this decision and the Supreme Court's subsequent denial of certiorari seemingly have confirmed the Individual Coercion Doctrine as a part of antitrust law,
its efficacy still remains open to question.
H.

THE ELEMENTS OF TYING

LAW

In Northern Pacific Railway v. United States3 the Supreme
Court defined a tying arrangement as "an agreement by a party to
sell one product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will
not purchase that product from any other supplier." By conditioning the sales of products or services on one another, such agreements
adversely affect competition by requiring buyers to purchase unwanted items and by forestalling sales by competitors.' For these
reasons tying arrangements have been declared per se illegal under
U.L. REv. 626 (1965); Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws,
72 HARv. L. REv. 50 (1958); Comment, Franchise Tie-ins and Antitrust: A CriticalAnalysis,
1973 Wis. L. Rav. 847.
2. 68 F.R.D. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd, 531 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct.
74 (1976).
3. 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
4. The Northern Pacific Court recognized these anticompetitive effects:
Indeed "tying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition." . . . They deny competitors free access to the market for the tied product, not
because the party imposing the tying requirements has a better product or a lower price
but because of his power or leverage in another market. At the same time buyers are
forced to forego their free choice between competing products.
Id. at 6.
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both section 3 of the Clayton Act 5 and section 1 of the Sherman Act.,
Thus, once the statutory requisites are met, these agreements, like
several other vertical restraints, are conclusively presumed to violate the antitrust laws without further examination into their particular circumstances or justifications.7
The Supreme Court has stated three basic requirements for the
establishment of an illegal tie: (1) there must be separate tying and
tied products;8 (2) the seller must have sufficient economic power
in the tying product to appreciably restrain competition in the tied
product;' and (3) the arrangement must affect a "not insubstantial"
amount of commerce, based upon the total volume of sales to all
purchasers under the tie."° These criteria have received varying ap5. Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970), which is directed at tying arrangements,
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce. . . to lease or make a sale or
contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented, . . . or fix a price charged therefor, or discount
from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the
lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise,
machinery, supplies, or other commodities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor
or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition,
agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
6. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1975), provides that
[elvery contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.
Tying arrangements may also be condemned as unfair methods of competition under § 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (Supp. V 1975). See, e.g., FTC v. Texaco,
Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968); Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965); see Part V.A.
infra.
7. As the Court noted in Northern Pacific,
certain agreements or practices . . . because of their pernicious effect on competition
and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and
therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or
the business excuse for their use.
356 U.S. at 5; see Comment, supra note 1, at 851.
Even if a tying arrangement does not meet the statutory requirements for per se illegality,
it nonetheless must be scrutinized under the general standards of the Sherman Act. Accordingly, if a more thorough examination of the purposes and effects of the practice finds it
unreasonable, a tying arrangement still will be held illegal. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United
States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 498-500 (1969).
8. That is, there must be a tying product which cannot be obtained without the purchase of a tied product. See., e.g., Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394
U.S. 495, 507 (1969); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
For a discussion of the separability of products in tying cases, see Ross, The Single Product
Issue in Antitrust Tying: A FunctionalApproach, 23 EMORY L.J. 963 (1974).
9. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958).
10. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 501 (1969);
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947). Tied sales of as little as
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plication, however, due to the jurisdictional and substantive distinctions between the Clayton and Sherman Acts. 1 First, while by
its own terms section three of the Clayton Act pertains only to tying
arrangements in which both the tying and tied products are
"commodities,"' 2 the Sherman Act is applicable to all tie-ins. Secondly, although a tying arrangement violates section three of the
Clayton Act whenever either "sufficient economic power" is shown
or a "not insubstantial" amount of commerce is affected, section
one of the Sherman Act bans tie-ins only when both conditions are
met.'3: The import of these distinctions has been lessened, however,
by the Court's recent blurring of the second and third requirements, 4 and now it is generally agreed that the two statutes should
be construed similarly in regard to their prohibitions of tying."
Perhaps the requirement most often considered by the courts
is that of economic power in the tying product. The early cases
demanded a monopolistic position or market dominance in the
seller, measured in terms of market data." In Northern Pacific,
however, the Supreme Court retreated from this standard for illegality, requiring only "sufficient economic power to impose an appreciable restraint."' 7 In a later case, United States v. Loew's, Inc., 8 the
$60,800, United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 49 (1962), and $190,000, Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. at 502, have been found "not insubstantial."
11. See generally Comment, supra note 1, at 851-53.
12. See, e.g., Advance Business Systems & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d 55 (4th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970); Columbia Broadcasting System v. Amana
Refrigeration, Inc., 295 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1961); note 5 supra.
13. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608-09 (1953).
14. In Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969), the
Supreme Court found that "sufficient economic power" could be inferred from the fact that
a tying arrangement has been imposed upon an "appreciable number of buyers." Id. at 50304; see note 21 infra and accompanying text. Since a court may therefore infer "sufficient
economic power" if a tying arrangement affects a "not insubstantial amount of commerce,"
Fortnerhas virtually eliminated the distinctions between the two statutes. See Comment,
Physical Tie-ins as Antitrust Violations, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 224, 228.
15. See Kamenshine, Competition Versus Fairness in Franchising,40 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 197 (1971); Pearson, supra note 1, at 653 n.96; Turner, supra note 1, at 58.
16. See, e.g., Time-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 610-13
(1953); United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 455 (1922).
17. 356 U.S. at 11. In Northern Pacific the tying product was a unique leasehold or
ownership of uniquely placed land. Because the land was so strategically located, many
lessees and purchasers entered into contracts containing preferential routing clauses that
required them to ship over Northern Pacific's lines all commodities produced on the land.
The Court concluded that the desirability of the land created sufficient economic power in
Northern Pacific. The Court went so far as to say that "[tihe very existence of this host of
tying arrangements is itself compelling evidence of the defendant's great power." Id. at 7-8.
18. 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
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Court held that the requisite power may be inferred from the tying
product's uniqueness or desirability.' Finally, in Fortner Enter0 the Court reasoned that
prises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp."
sufficient economic power can be inferred merely from the very
existence of tying arrangements on an "appreciable number of buyers. ' 21 Thus the cases have reflected a clear liberalization of the
quantum of economic power required to establish a per se illegal
22
tying arrangement.
Nevertheless, the mere existence of economic power is not
enough. Such power must be used.23 The seller actually must have
employed his leverage to effectuate the tie-in by refusing to sell the
tying product separately from the tied product.24 Unfortunately, the
courts have not made entirely clear the meaning of "use," and this
uncertainty in part has led to the controversy surrounding the Individual Coercion Doctrine. The concept of use may refer only to the
simple achievement of a tie-that the seller must have conditioned
the availability of the tying product on the purchase of the tied
product. On the other hand, the "use" requirement may also imply
that the seller's economic power must have subjectively compelled
the complaining purchaser to enter the arrangement against his
will.
IH.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL COERCION DOCTRINE

A.

Establishmentof a Coercion Requirement

The concept of coercion was first discussed by the Supreme
Court in an early non-tying case, FordMotor Co. v. United States.2
Prior to that case, Ford Motor Co. had entered into a consent decree
19. Id. at 45. Loew's conditioned the license or sale of television rights to show its
copyrighted feature films upon acceptance of a package of inferior and unwanted films. The
Court found the feature films sufficiently desirable to television station customers to warrant
a finding of sufficient economic power.

20. 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
21.

Id. at 504. The subsidiary credit corporation of U.S. Steel conditioned loans upon

the purchase of prefabricated houses from U.S. Steel. The tying product (credit) was found
unique because 100% financing could not be obtained elsewhere. The Court stated that "the
proper focus of concern is whether the seller has the power to . . . impose . . . a tie-in, with
respect to any appreciable number of buyers within the market." Id.
22. See Comment, supra note 1, at 854.
23. See, e.g., Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 365 F. Supp. 888, 892 (D. Conn.
1973).
24. See, e.g., Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 7 (1958). See also
Solomon, An Analysis of Tying Arrangements: The Offer You Can't Refuse, 26 MEMcER L.

REV. 547, 556 (1975).
25. 335 U.S. 303 (1948).
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with the Government that restrained various practices by which it
had influenced dealers to patronize particular finance companies.2 '
The decree provided that it could be modified or suspended if similar restrictions were not imposed upon Ford's chief competitor, General Motors Corp., and that a guilty verdict against GMC would be
deemed a determination of the illegality of these practices." After
a jury returned a general verdict of guilty against GMC upon instructions that "coercion" of dealers to use certain finance companies was illegal but that mere "persuasion" was not,2 Ford moved
to suspend or modify provisions of its decree forbidding practices
falling in the latter category. On appeal, the Supreme Court accepted the distinction between "coercion" and "persuasion" and,
finding the latter permissible, affirmed modification of Ford's consent decree with regard to the "persuasive" practices."
Subsequently, the Court began to refer to the notion of coercion
in tying cases but failed to clarify the role the concept should play.
In Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,3" for example,
the Court observed that
[b]y conditioning his sale of one commodity on the purchase of another, a
seller coerces the abdication of buyers' independent judgment as to the "tied"
product's merits and insulates it from the competitive stresses of the open
market.

3

26. The consent decree (1) precluded Ford from arranging with any finance company
that an agent of either Ford or the finance company be present with any dealer for the purpose
of influencing the dealer to patronize the finance company; (2) precluded Ford from recommending, endorsingx or advertising any finance company to dealers; and (3) restrained Ford
from establishing "'any practice, procedure or plan . . . for the purpose of enabling...
any.

. .

finance company or companies to enjoy a competitive advantage

....

'

Id. at 315-

16.
27. Id. at 310-11.
28. The trial judge drew a distinction between practices such as cancellation of a
dealer's contract or refusal to renew it, which he characterized as "coercion," and other
practices for which "persuasion," "exposition," or "argument" were fair characterizations.
See id. at 316-18 & n.3.
29. The Government had argued that the Court should refuse modification because the
"persuasive" acts upheld by the trial judge also were illegal under the Sherman Act. The
Court, however, found this contention unadmitted and unproven, and stated that its decision
was limited to upholding the operation of the consent decree. Id. at 320. Nevertheless, Justice
Black in dissent argued against the semantic distinctions between "persuasion" and
"coercion," and reasoned that the methods of persuasion constituted unreasonable restraints
of trade. Id. at 325 (Black, J., dissenting).
30. 345 U.S. 594 (1953). In Times-Picayune the Court upheld under Sherman Act
attack an arrangement whereby classified and general display advertisers in defendant's
publications could purchase only combined insertions appearing in both its morning and
evening papers, and not in either separately.
31. Id. at 605 (emphasis added).
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The Court also opined that
[tihe common core of the adjudicated unlawful tying arrangements is the
forced purchase of a second distinct commodity with the desired purchase of
32
a dominant "tying" product ....

A later case, United States v. Loew's Inc., 33 again alluded to the idea
of force in a tying case:
Television stations forced by appellants to take unwanted films were denied
access to films marketed by
other distributors who, in turn, were foreclosed
3
from selling to the stations.

The Court's statements indicate that the essence of a tie-in is the
conditioned availability of products and that coercion of the purchaser seems to follow this act. The Court did not specify, however,
whether this compulsion always should be presumed from the act
of conditioning, or whether it represents an additional prerequisite
beyond conditioning. The statement in Times-Picayune implies
that coercion is a necessary result of conditioning and that no independent showing is required. Loew's, however, may inject a subjective factor since the pressure exerted there was successful because
the appellants took unwanted films. Consequently, Loew's suggests
that a tying arrangement is illegal only if the purchaser was compelled to take a product or service against his will.
A number of lower courts subsequently began to dispose of
tying cases on the ground that the challenged arrangements were
not "coerced," but they did not make clear whether they were requiring anything beyond mere conditioning.35 In 1971, however, the
Second Circuit, in American ManufacturersMutual Insurance Co.
32. Id. at 614 (emphasis added).
33. 371 U.S. 38 (1962). Loew's conditioned the license or sale of television rights to show
its copyrighted feature films upon acceptance of other less desirable films. The court invalidated the arrangement under § 1 of the Sherman Act. See note 19 supra and accompanying
text.
34. 371 U.S. at 49 (emphasis added).
35. See, e.g., Broussard v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 350 F.2d 346, 352 (5th Cir. 1965);
McCullough Tool Co. v. Wells Surveys, Inc., 343 F.2d 381, 408 (10th Cir. 1965); Osborn v.
Sinclair Refining Co., 286 F.2d 832, 836 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 963 (1961);
American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769, 777 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 902 (1959). For example, in American Securit Co., a patent misuse case, the court
made this rather cryptic statement:
Whatever may be the asserted reason or justification of the patent owner, if he compels
a licensee to accept a package of patents or none at all, he employs one patent as a lever
to compel the acceptance of a license under another.
268 F.2d at 777 (emphasis added). The court seemingly failed to denote whether the patent
owner's compulsion of licensees encompassed activities beyond the simple conditioning of
patent purchases.
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v. American Broadcasting-ParamountTheatres,Inc.,3" expanded on
the potentially more restrictive standard implied by Loew's. In
American Manufacturers plaintiff claimed that the American
Broadcasting Company had required it to sponsor an early evening
news program over certain ABC affiliates as a condition to being
permitted to sponsor programs over other ABC affiliates whose
sponsorship plaintiff desired. The court affirmed dismissal of the
complaint, finding that plaintiff could not have been "coerced"
because it "did not seriously bargain for the elimination of the alleged unwanted sponsorships."37 The court relied on Loew's and
declared that "there can be no illegal tie unless unlawful coercion
by the seller influences the buyer's choice." ' The Second Circuit
later elaborated on this pronouncement in Capital Temporaries,
Inc. v. Olsten Corp.,"5 in which plaintiff alleged that in order to
operate a franchised temporary personnel business for "white collar" jobs, he was required to establish a "blue collar" operation
under another trademark. The court framed the legal issue as
whether plaintiff had to prove "actual coercion" outside the franchise agreement." Relying upon AmericanManufacturers,the court
proclaimed that before plaintiff could show a per se illegal tying
arrangement, he had to prove that he was an unwilling purchaser
of an unwanted product.41 It then concluded that the necessary compulsion could not be established from the instant franchise agreement because its terms merely gave plaintiff an option to operate
the "blue collar" service and did not require him to do so. 4 Finding
no evidence of extrinsic coercion,43 the court affirmed dismissal of
36. 446 F.2d 1131 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1063 (1972).
37. Id. at 1133. Plaintiff contended that even under these facts ABC must be found to
have coerced it into an illegal tie on the principle that whenever a seller offers a buyer a
package, the buyer states that he only desires certain items in the package, and the seller
delays at all in offering the items separately, a tie exists. Id. at 1136.
38. Id. at 1137. The court continued by stating that the economic foreclosure wrought
by tying arrangements
implies actual exertion of economic muscle, not a mere statement of bargaining terms
which, if they should be enforced by market power, would then incorporate an illegal
tie. To adopt [plaintiff's] position would subject businesses to threats of antitrust

sanctions whenever they tried by bravado to buttress a sagging market position by
initially offering small quantities of desired goods at high prices, in hopes of eliciting a
large order without further negotiation. Such bartering ploys are not generally the con-

cern of antitrust laws.
Id.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

506 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1974), afl'g 365 F. Supp. 888 (D. Conn. 1973).
506 F.2d at 661.
Id. at 662.
Id. at 665.
Id. at 661.
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the action. Thus from oblique references by the Supreme Court to
"coercion" the American Manufacturers court derived the requirement that it be present in every case. Although the court failed to
explain its use of the concept, it maintained that coercion must
"influence" a purchaser's decision to accept a tied item. This shift
in concern to the subjective effect on the purchaser is further evidenced by the Capital Temporaries court's demand that a purchaser prove his unwillingness to enter into a tying arrangement.
Although an individual purchaser could prove in most instances
that his will has been overcome, such a requirement raises a serious
issue when multiple purchasers attack a tying arrangement. Must
this coercion be proved individually, and if so, with what result?
B.

The Significance of an Individual Coercion Requirement

American Manufacturersand CapitalTemporariesset forth the
element of coercion only in the context of the single-plaintiff, singledefendant tying action. With increasing frequency, however, class
action suits are being utilized in the antitrust area." Tying cases are
especially suitable for class action treatment because ties are generally imposed on numerous purchasers. 5 For example, most suits by
franchisees against franchisors allege that they have been required
to purchase supplies or raw materials from the franchisor or other
designated source as a condition of using the franchisor's trademark." Since such tie-ins appear fairly uniform over all franchisees,
the class action device might become a significant tool of antitrust
enforcement.
To qualify for such treatment, however, a class must meet the
formal requirements of rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition to satisfying the prerequisites for maintenance of
a class action stated in subsection (a),4 7 a class must fulfill one of
44. See 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1781, at 79
(1972) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER].
45. In fact, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly
recognized that class actions are particularly applicable in tying situations:
[A] patentee of a machine, charged with selling or licensing the machine on condition
that purchasers or licensees also purchase or obtain licenses to use an ancillary unpatented machine, could be sued on a class basis by a numerous group of purchasers or
licensees, or by a numerous group of competing sellers or licensors of the unpatented
machine, to test the legality of the "tying" condition.
Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 28 U.S.C.A. FED. R. Civ. P., RULES 17 TO 23.2, at 299
(1972).
46. See Comment, supra note 1, at 850.
47. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) states:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or
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the three conditions set forth in subsection (b).11 The general view
is that most private antitrust actions should be brought under rule
23(b)(3),11 which requires that questions of law or fact common to
the class predominate over issues pertaining only to individual
members. 5 Although the rule does not define "predominate," it is
clear that common questions need not be dispositive; rather, if one
or more of the central issues in an action are common to the class
and a common nucleus of operative facts exists, a class action is
proper under rule 23(b) (3). In antitrust actions courts generally hold
that if the defendant's activities constitute a "common course of
conduct," the issue of liability
is common and thus a class may be
51
certified under the rule.

The potential impact of the coercion requirement stated by
American Manufacturers on the maintenance of class tying actions
is significant. If a single plaintiff must establish that his acceptance
of a tied item was coerced and not voluntary, the question arises
whether each member of a class of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of
purchasers of the tied item similarly must prove his state of mind.
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common
to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
48. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) provides:
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action
if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the
class would create a risk of

(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or

(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as
a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the
adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests;
or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication
of the controversy.
49. Because damages are such an important element in antitrust suits, injunctive relief

is not predominant; thus rule 23(b)(2) probably is not the proper route. Professor Moore
concludes that "[in almost all such situations, the suit should be treated under (b)(3)."
3B MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.45, at 23-708 to -709 n.43 (2d ed. 1977).
50.

See note 48 supra.

51. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 44, § 1778 at 53-54, § 1781 at 79-86.
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If so, a second question is raised whether this individual proof of
coercion renders individual issues of law and fact predominant over
common questions, thereby defeating class action certification
under rule 23(b)(3). It is these issues that are the focal point of the
Individual Coercion Doctrine, and that have sparked controversy
and inconsistent results.
C.

Genesis of the Individual Coercion Doctrine

In 1970 Lah v. Shell Oil Co.52 first raised the question of individual coercion in the class action context. In Lah plaintiff sought to
represent a proposed class of Shell dealers, claiming that Shell had
conditioned the sale of its gasoline upon the dealers' entry into
short-term leases of real estate and the purchase of other unwanted
products. 53 The court framed the first of two basic issues as whether
Shell had refused to sell gasoline except on the lease condition. The
court decided that this was a question of fact which, with respect
to 140 dealers, became 140 separate questions of fact. 4 The court
therefore concluded that individual inquiry would be required. 5 On
the second issue, whether a "dominant" franchisor must coerce its
franchisees in order to run afoul of the antitrust laws, the court
relied on Ford Motor to declare that liability was a question of fact
between persuasion and coercion, which again became 140 questions
of fact.56 The court then found that because the resolution of each
individual fact question would have no bearing on the others, the
predominating questions were individual and not common.57 Thus
the court denied the class action motion.
Lah was followed two years later by a similar case, A bercrombie
v. Lum's Inc.51 In Abercrombie, plaintiff sought to represent in a
class action approximately 400 franchisees of Lum's, a fast food
franchise, complaining of a number of ties that imposed purchasing
and lease requirements as a condition of using the Lum's trade52. 50 F.R.D. 198 (S.D. Ohio 1970).
53. Plaintiff alleged that in forcing short.term leases upon dealers Shell could use its
increased bargaining power to tie these other items, such as trading stamps and games. Id.
at 199.
54. Id. at 200.
55. Id. The court continued by stating that class actions in the antitrust field generally
are limited to cases in which a single question of fact, such as a conspiracy to fix prices,
furnishes the basis for the action. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 345 F. Supp. 387 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
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mark.-9 Because some of the alleged tie-ins were imposed outside of
any written agreement and because the franchise agreements in
which the others were contained differed in various respects,"0 the
court found a proliferation of issues not proper for class treatment.
Recognizing, however, that tying arrangements can be proved
through conduct extrinsic to an agreement, 61 the court stated that
proof of the instant ties could come from an examination of the
franchisees' dealings with Lum's. 2 Discussing this possibility, the
court relied upon FordMotor for the proposition that to prove illegal
tying arrangements arising from such business conduct, the franchisees had to prove that they were coerced, not merely persuaded, into
purchasing the tied products. The court then echoed the American
Manufacturersrequirement that "there can be no illegal tie unless
unlawful coercion by the seller influences the buyer's choice." 3
The Abercrombie court then turned to the question whether
such coercion must be shown on an individual basis. The court
answered affirmatively, declaring that proof of coercion will always
vary from franchisee to franchisee:
If [plaintiffs] were to establish that they made forced purchases it would not
necessarily follow that other franchisees were similarly coerced .... Franchisees may have purchased items from defendants for a variety of reasons
ranging from convenience, to attractiveness of the product, to, as [plainof the issue requires separate distinct
tiffs] claim, coercion. Determination
and individual, not common, proof.6 '

Once the court had characterized coercion as an individual issue, it
dismissed the class action, relying on Lah to hold that coercion
raises a predominance of individual questions. 5
59. Plaintiff claimed that the franchisees were unlawfully required:
(a) to purchase signs and equipment from defendants and to purchase furniture, fixtures, supplies, foods, and beverages from defendants or their approved suppliers, (b)
to lease their restaurant sites to defendants who would then sublease the sites back to
plaintiffs at the same rental paid by defendants plus 5% of their gross sales and, in some
cases, other charges, (c)in some cases to secure their sites from persons designated by
Lum's and to deal with building contractors designated by Lum's, and (d) to permit
Lum's, upon termination of the franchise agreement, to repurchase equipment and
fixtures from them.
Id. at 388-89.
60. There were some twelve different types of agreements executed by Lum's and its
franchisees, none of which contained overt tying arrangements. Id. at 390.
61. Advance Business Systems & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
62. 345 F. Supp. at 391.
63. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
64. 345 F. Supp. at 391-92.
65. Id. at 392.
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While at first glance Lah and Abercrombie appear identical,
closer scrutiny reveals that the latter decision goes much further in
articulating the Individual Coercion Doctrine. The Lah court expressed no coercion requirement for tying cases; rather, it carefully
separated the issues of product tying and franchisor coercion. The
court viewed the tying question simply as whether Shell had conditioned the sale of its gasoline upon the dealers' entry into short-term
leases and never stated that coercion also would be necessary to
prove the tie. Although the court did find Ford Motor to demand a
showing of coercion in order to establish liability on the part of a
dominant franchisor, it did so apart from its examination of the
alleged tie-ins. Thus Lah declares only that a purchaser must prove
conditioning by the seller to show illegal tying and that this limited
proof raises a predominance of individual questions. Abercrombie,
however, does dictate a coercion requirement. Unlike the court in
Lah, the Abercrombie court extended Ford Motor into the tying
area and found it to necessitate a finding of coercion in tying cases.
Furthermore, while Lah never inquired into the subjective intentions of the plaintiff franchisees, A bercrombie found that the issue
of coercion necessarily entails inquiry into the personal motives of
complaining purchasers. The reason for Abercrombie's extension of
coercion into the class action context is evident. In the two years
between Lah and Abercrombie, the Second Circuit in American
Manufacturershad established a coercion requirement for all tying
cases. Thus it is Abercrombie that crystallized the Individual Coercion Doctrine in its present form, requiring individual proof of
subjective coercion.
D. Subsequent Development
Abercrombie left a predictable aftermath for a number of reasons. First, although it represents the initial case both to state a
coercion requirement for all tying cases and to discuss the necessity
of its individual proof, its holding appears in logical sequence with
Ford Motor, American Manufacturers,and Lah. Secondly, in addition to the support it derives from these cases, the opinion is tightly
reasoned and persuasive in its own right. Finally, and most significantly, the case posits an inviting black-letter rule applicable to all
tying cases. Thus it is not surprising that many subsequent courts,
when faced with class action suits claiming illegal ties, have denied
certification almost automatically, citing Abercrombie as support. 6
66. See, e.g., Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307 (5th
Cir. 1976); Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1974), aff'g 365
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Consequently, these courts often have failed to undertake independent analysis of the Individual Coercion Doctrine.
Nevertheless, the cases following Abercrombie warrant further
examination. Although they involve the same general factual situation as Abercrombie, these cases have evidenced several distinct
fact patterns that raise questions concerning the parameters of the
Doctrine. This subsequent development has to some extent defined
the Doctrine's contours, and yet the cases often have reached inconsistent results. Thus the post-A bercrombie development in the Individual Coercion Doctrine will be detailed in light of the issues it has
presented.
(1) The Nature of Coercion
The most fundamental issue raised by the Doctrine is the proper definition of "coercion." Although the post-Abercrombie cases
have assumed that coercion is a necessary element of an illegal tying
arrangement, they have failed to articulate a consistent practical
standard for determining when coercion is present. For example, the
standard used by the American Manufacturers court was whether
coercion "influenced" the buyer's choice; however, it did not indicate the type or degree of influence required. Similarly, the Capital
the test as whether a plaintiff is the
Temporaries court formulated
"unwilling" purchaser67 of the tied product but did not elucidate
how such unwillingness could be established. At one extreme, a
presumption of coercion might be negated only if a purchaser actually desired and sought out the combination of tying and tied
products. At the other extreme, the requisite coercion might be
absent when a purchaser apparently accepts a tie willingly despite
strong mental reservations against doing so.68 The problem is further
complicated by the fact that the courts have not stated upon whom
the burden of proving or rebutting coercion is placed, a question
that obviously affects the facility with which tying arrangements
can be proved.
F. Supp. 888 (D. Conn. 1973); Hehir v. Shell Oil Co., [1976-1] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
60,928 at 69,042 (D. Mass. 1976); Halverson v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 69 F.R.D. 331,
335 (N.D. ill. 1974); Thompson v. T.F.I. Companies, 64 F.R.D. 140, 147 (N.D. Ill. 1974);
Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 376 F. Supp. 1136 (S.D. Fla.
1974); Smith v. Denny's Restaurants, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 459, 461 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Bogosian v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 62 F.R.D. 124 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Seligson v. Plum Tree, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 343,
346 (E.D. Pa. 1973); DiCostanzo v. Chrysler Corp., 57 F.R.D. 495, 498-99 (E.D. Pa. 1972);
E.B.E., Inc. v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
67. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
68. See Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 65, 112 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
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A few courts, however, have mentioned several considerations
relevant to making a finding of coercion. First, one court has pointed
out the importance of determining whether a complaining purchaser
was aware of the challenged tie when he entered into the arrangement, implying that one cannot be coerced by something of which
he has no knowledge. 9 Another court, in assessing whether several
plaintiffs had unwillingly purchased an allegedly tied product,
found it persuasive that the plaintiffs already owned satisfactory
versions of the item. 70 Two cases have asked whether the plaintiff
ever objected to the imposition of a tying arrangement.7" The most
significant consideration, however, stated in American Manufacturers, is whether the complaining buyer ever seriously bargained
to eliminate the tie.7" Based upon this statement it has been
argued that coercion can be found only upon a showing that a purchaser actually negotiated to remove a tie-in and that he capitulated only upon the seller's insistence. 73 Nevertheless, these suggested factors have not removed the uncertainty surrounding the
notion of coercion, and thus it remains a difficult concept to apply.
(2)

Form of the Tying Arrangement

Another query implicit in Abercrombie and its progeny is the
form to which a tying arrangement must be reduced before individual proof of coercion is unnecessary. A bercrombie itself reached the
individual coercion issue only because some of the alleged tie-ins
were not in written contract form, but the court did not specify how
it might have avoided the question. 74 Rather than articulating any
consistent standard, the post-Abercrombie cases addressing this
issue have taken divergent stances. A first group of courts has declared that a contractual provision although it only allegedly effects
a tie-in, is still inherently coercive since it is backed by the force of
law, and that a class action therefore is appropriate to challenge
it. 7 A second set of courts, however, has rejected this presumption

69. Plekowski v. Ralston Purina Co., 68 F.R.D. 443, 451 (M.D. Ga. 1975); see text
accompanying note 83 infra.
70. Hill v. A-T-O, Inc., 535 F.2d 1349, 1355 (2d Cir. 1976).
71. Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307, 1327 (5th Cir.
1976); Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658, 666 (2d Cir. 1974).
72. See note 37 supra and accompanying text. See also Capital Temporaries, Inc. v.
Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658, 665 (2d Cir. 1974).
73. See Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 65, 112 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
74. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., Halverson v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 69 F.R.D. 331, 335 (N.D. Ill.
1974); In re 7-Eleven Franchise Antitrust Litigation, [1972] TaDE RE. REP. (CCH)
74,156, at 92,830 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D.
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when the contract terms in question did not in and of themselves
constitute tie-ins, and therefore has required an independent showing of compulsion. For example, two cases found that franchise
agreements imposing purchasing requirements did not "on their
face" constitute tie-ins since the franchisees could purchase elsewhere if certain conditions were met.7 Similarly, in Capital
Temporaries77 the court refused to infer coercion when the "plain

language" of a franchise agreement did not absolutely bind the
plaintiff to certain business requirements, and thus required independent proof. Also in Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp.78 the court refuted
plaintiffs' assertion that coercion could be inferred from "the practical economic effect" of contracts when their wording did not clearly
79
indicate the existence of a tie.
A third group of courts has rejected the inference of coercion
even from clear contractual ties. For example, the Capital
Temporaries court suggested that even if the instant contract had
on its face bound plaintiff to the alleged business requirements, it
did not necessarily follow that coercion was present." Similarly, in
Plekowski v. Ralston PurinaCo. 1 the court rejected the presumption of coercion from any contract term, declaring that in all tying
cases
proof of actual coercion "outside of the agreement" must clearly be shown; it
is insufficient to prove merely that the purchaser was a party to a contract
containing an alleged tying clause.2
Cal. 1967), modified sub nom., Chicken Delight, Inc. v. Harris, 412 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1969),
on modification, 311 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd in part,rev'd in part,and remanded,
448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
76. Thompson v. T.F.I. Companies, 64 F.R.D. 140, 146 (N.D. 111. 1974); Smith v.
Denny's Restaurants, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 459 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
77. 506 F.2d 658, 665 (2d Cir. 1974), aff'g 365 F. Supp. 888 (D. Conn. 1973).
78. 62 F.R.D. 124, 136-37 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (emphasis in original).
79. On the other side of the issue, one court has presumed coercion from a contract that
contained an express tying term. Hi-Co Enterprises, Inc. v. ConAgra, Inc., [1976-2] TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) 61,053, at 69,756 (S.D. Ga. 1976).
80. 506 F.2d 658, 665-66 (2d Cir. 1974). The court reasoned:
[Ilt does not follow that because the contract required the opening of a blue collar
operation, it was therefore a tying arrangement. Quite obviously, a franchise agreement,
like any contract of sale, may obligate the purchaser to accept numerous commodities,
trademarked or not; this does not mean that the purchaser was coerced in any fashion
to take some or all to get one or some.
Id. See also Hehir v. Shell Oil Co., [1976-11 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) T 60,928 (D. Mass.
1976); Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 62 F.R.D. 124, 135 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
81. 68 F.R.D. 443 (M.D. Ga. 1975). A former customer of Ralston Purina brought an
action based on alleged tying of feed purchases to advancement of loans and to deferral of
payment for such purchases, and sought to bring the action as a representative of more than
6,500 of Ralston Purina's past and present customers.
82. Id. at 450-51 (citation omitted).
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Therefore, the court required plaintiffs to show whether they were
aware of the challenged contract clauses, whether they were influenced thereby, whether they had attempted to negotiate particular
clauses out of their agreements, and whether they had attempted
to purchase elsewhere. Because the court found such questions to
necessitate individual proof, it denied certification to plaintiff's putative class.83
The inconsistency in these cases creates uncertainty as to the
correct response to a contract term allegedly imposing a tie. A court
might find inherent coercion regardless of the form of the challenged
provision; on the other hand, it might require independent proof of
coercion despite a boilerplate clause imposing the most overt tie. A
court could opt for the middle ground and attempt to make an
initial determination whether a contractual provision "on its face"
constitutes a tying arrangement. This latter route may be the most
difficult since it requires the court, on an early class action motion,
to resolve a major issue in a tying suit without full litigation. The
task is especially formidable given the obvious lack of consistent
standards for this determination. Thus the issue of tie-in form and
its relation to the Individual Coercion Doctrine remains open.
(3)

Uniformity of the Tying Arrangement
A related issue arising in Abercrombie and succeeding cases is
how uniform an alleged tying provision must be before coercion will
be presumed on a class basis. Abercrombie demanded individual
proof of coercion in part because a number of different Lum's franchise agreements were in effect, materially varying in several respects.8 4 The court, however, did not specify the circumstances
under which individual proof would have been obviated. An earlier
case, Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 5 permitted a class action in a
suit involving a single standard contract clause. Similarly, the court
certified a class of franchisees in Butkus v. Chicken Unlimited Enterprises, Inc., 6 in which it was clear that all potential members had
signed one of only two possible contracts upon which their tying
claims were based. A post-Abercrombie case, Halverson v. Conven83. Id. at 451.
84. See notes 60 & 74 supra and accompanying text.
85. 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal. 1967), modified sub nom., Chicken Delight, Inc. v.
Harris, 412 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1969), on modification,311 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955
(1972).
86. [1971] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 73,780 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
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ient Food Mart, Inc., 7 also found a class action appropriate in a
situation in which five different franchise agreement forms were in
use and each contained a common exclusive purchase requirement.
More recently, the court in Esposito v. Mister Softee, Inc.88 stated
that "[w]here claims are founded on violations of franchise agreements which are essentially the same, the franchisees are members
of a proper class as defined by F. R. Civ. P. 23."
Several cases, however, have dismissed potential class actions
in part because of the number and disparity of challenged contracts.
8 9 defendant made available nineIn Thompson v. T.F.I. Companies,
teen different operator's license agreement forms for use by its franchisees in negotiating with licensees in a three-tiered franchise system. 0 The particular clauses relating to the selection and approval
of suppliers varied significantly. Several of the model forms required
licensees to purchase only from sources designated by the defendant
franchisor; a second series required purchases only from franchisees
or other designated source; a third group made this same requirement but granted licensees the right to purchase from any source if
quality specifications were met. Adding to this dissimilarity was the
fact that the franchisees were free to modify the model forms.' Thus
when plaintiff brought a class action tying suit on behalf of all
licensees, the court found that the "potentially great disparity"
between the contractual provisions resulted in a predominance of
92
individual issues.
Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp. 3 presented an even more complicated situation. Plaintiffs sought class certification on behalf of a
nationwide class consisting of all present and former retail gasoline
service station dealers who had leased their respective stations from
any one of fifteen defendants, major oil companies, contending that
they were required to buy and sell only the gasoline supplied by
their respective lessors. Because it was confronted by over 400 contractual forms containing no common clause supporting plaintiffs'
allegations, the court concluded that proof of the exertion of coer87. 69 F.R.D. 331, 336 (N.D. Ill.
1974).
88. [1976-1] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 60,887, at 68,868 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
89. 64 F.R.D. 140 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
90. Defendant T.F.I. Companies wholly owned Tastee-Freez International, Inc., sole
owner of the Tastee-Freez trademark. Typically, Tastee-Freez entered into agreements
with franchisees whereby the latter assumed responsibility for given territories. In turn the
franchisees entered into license agreements authorizing the operation of Tastee-Freez establishments. Id. at 143.
91. Id. at 144.
92. Id. at 146-47.
93. 62 F.R.D. 124 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
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cive force on each individual dealer would be necessary.94 The court
went a step further, however, and indicated that even if the disparate agreements had contained a common tying provision, a determination of individual coercion still would have been required. 5
Synthesis of these cases lends some guidance on the issue of
uniformity. When there exists a fairly large number of substantially
different contractual forms (e.g., greater that nineteen) containing
no common tying provision, individual proof will be necessary.
Thompson indicates the type of variance in alleged tying clauses
that will demand such proof. Conversely, when there are a limited
number of similar forms (e.g., less than five) that contain nearly
identical tying provisions, coercion generally will be inferred from
the contracts themselves. Nevertheless, the difficulty in determining whether sufficient uniformity exists in a given case leaves this
question open as well.
(4) Conspiracy or Policy to Tie
Another recurring fact pattern arises in those cases in which
plaintiffs have complained of organized conspiracies or policies to
impose tying arrangements based upon extrinsic conduct. On the
question whether proof of such activity will raise a class-wide inference of coercion, the courts again have reached inconsistent results.
The issue first arose in Abercrombie, in which plaintiffs argued
that there were common questions of law and fact going to the
existence of such a conspiracy. The court, however, stated that
whether or not a conspiracy in fact existed, "the restraint of trade
which must be proven in a tying case is an agreement, express or
implied, between buyer and seller. .

. .""

The court reasoned that

proof of conspiracy to impose tying arrangements would not establish this requisite agreement since the relationship between buyer
and seller necessarily must be shown on an individual basis." The
court in In re 7-Eleven FranchiseAntitrust Litigation" reached a
similar outcome. In that case convenience grocery store franchisees
alleged a nationwide conspiracy by the franchisor to compel them
to purchase from designated suppliers and argued that such activity
was tantamount to the coercive effect of a contractual provision.
The court held this contention unpersuasive, finding that it failed
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 136-37.
Id. at 135.
345 F. Supp. at 391 (emphasis in original).
Id.
[19721 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 74,156 (M.D. Cal. 1972).
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to take into account the effectiveness of the coercion, which depended upon the relative position of the franchisor and each franchisee, and thus necessitated individual proof.9
A different approach was taken in In re Clark Oil & Refining
Corp. Antitrust Litigation,"Iin which a class action was brought on
behalf of retail service station dealers alleging an overall policy of
coercive behavior by their branded supplier to force them into tying
arrangements. Although defendants argued that proof of individual
coercion was required in all cases, the court declared that
[i]ndividual acts of coercion may be just that-isolated incidents with no
implications beyond the specific individuals being coerced-or they may be
part of an overall pattern which has a coercive impact beyond the particular
parties involved.' '

The court noted that coercive activities aimed at one dealer
under some circumstances could'have the effect of coercing all dealers. Because the court at that time could not determine whether
a condionly individual incidents of coercion were involved, it made
02
known.'
were
facts
more
until
certification
class
tional
In a recent case, Hill v. A-T-O, Inc.,"°3 the Second Circuit also
found coercion in a policy to impose tie-ins. In that case defendant
gave purchasers of vacuum cleaners free membership certificates in
a buying service, which enabled them to obtain other merchandise
at substantial discounts. The district court dismissed the action,
holding that plaintiffs had not established "actual coercion." The
Second Circuit reversed and remanded, however, because defendants admitted to a policy of never offering buying plan memberships separately from the sale of vacuum cleaners. Clarifying its
earlier decision in Capital Temporaries, the court stated that
[a]n unremitting policy of tie-in, if accompanied by sufficient market power
in the tying product to appreciably restrain competition in the market for the
tied product constitutes the requisite coercion under Capital Temporar-

ies. . . . 104
Thus the more modern view appears to presume the requisite coercion on a class-wide basis from evidence of a concerted policy to
impose tying arrangements.
99. Id. at 92,830. See also Thompson v. T.F.I. Companies, 64 F.R.D. 140, 147 (N.D. Ill.
1974).

100. [1974-1]

TRADE REG.

REP. (CCH) $ 74,880 (E.D. Wis. 1974). Plaintiffs alleged that

Clark Oil had engaged in price-fixing as well as tying.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 95,972 (emphasis added).
Id.
535 F.2d 1349, 1355 (2d Cir. 1976).

104.

Id.
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(5)

Acceptance of the Tying Arrangement

McMackin v. Schwinn Bicycle Co.'"' raises a fifth issue:
whether coercion can be presumed from the fact that a tie-in has
been successfully imposed on many purchasers. In McMackin plaintiff sought to represent a class of all Schwinn franchisees, contending that Schwinn's franchise agreements constituted a tying arrangement by requiring dealers to use only Schwinn factory parts
and accessories in servicing Schwinn products. Relying on the Supreme Court's statement in Fortner that the elements of per se
illegality for tie-ins are unnecessary to establish an unreasonable
8 the court, in an opinion by
restraint of trade,""
Judge McLaren,
declared that economic power and coercion therefore are not necessary elements of a Sherman Act violation. It then reasoned that
inquiry into the purposes and effects of the restraint to determine
whether it was unreasonable would be a question common to all
class members." 7 Assuming, however, that plaintiffs were attempting to show per se illegality, the court noted Fortner'sdeclaration
that the element of sufficient economic power could be shown by the
successful imposition of burdensome terms on any appreciable
number of buyers." °8 From this statement the instant court reasoned
that coercion also could be presumed from the acceptance of a tiein by a large number of purchasers. Recognizing the American
Manufacturershad required actual proof of coercion, the court distinguished it on the ground that there was no consideration of acceptance by an appreciable number of buyers in that case. Nevertheless the court warned that in order to obtain class certification
plaintiffs must show that alleged tying arrangements are
"burdensome," and that proof of burdensomeness will involve com09
mon questions of law and fact."
One year later Judge McLaren vacated his prior ruling and held
that the "burdensome tie" test could not properly be used in this
particular class action.1 10 In an abbreviated discussion the court
simply stated that in this case

106.

74,220 (N.D. Il. 1972), vacated, 11974-1] TRADE
75,047 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
See note 7 supra and accompanying text.

107.

[19721

105.

[19721

TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)

REG. REP. (CCH)

TRADE REG. REP.

(CCH) at 93,020.

108. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
109. [1972] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) at 93,020. See also Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews &
Co., 550 F.2d 1207 (9th Cir. 1977).
110. [1974-1] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 75,047 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
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the impact ("burdensomeness") upon Schwinn dealers, past and present, of
the alleged tie-in clause would have to be determined individually both as to
fact and amount of damages.'

Where the two McMackin rulings left the Individual Coercion Doctrine is unclear, for the argument was not raised again until Ungar.
Apparently, however, the latter holding would have to be regarded
as more influential, especially since it is in line with other cases
demanding individual proof of coercion.
(6)

Summary

Although analysis of the cases enunciating the Individual Coercion Doctrine reveals that they often have evidenced varied application, the doctrine at this point at least can be summarized. In tying
cases in which class certification is sought, the courts have held that
in the absence of an overt contractual tie an unlawful tying arrangement cannot be established without proof of "individual coercion."
Such proof appears to require a showing by plaintiff of the circumstances surrounding the relationship between the seller and each
purchaser in order to demonstrate that the purchaser was "coerced"
into the tie. Various types of evidence have been found to establish
this coercion. The effect of the individual proof requirement is a
predominance of individual questions of law and fact over common
questions, resulting in a denial of class certification under rule

23(b) (3) .112
Despite the minor inconsistencies found in the cases, the blackletter rule first articulated in Abercrombie had by 1975 assumed
accepted status, if only because of the sheer number of courts following it." 3 Thus it came as a surprise when in that year the District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania refuted the Individual Coercion Doctrine in Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America,
Inc. 114
IV.

UNGAR v. DUNKIN' DONUTS OF AMEICA, INc.

In 1972 consolidated actions were filed against Dunkin' Donuts,
Inc., by fourteen of its present and former franchisees, alleging a
wide range of antitrust violations. Plaintiffs averred that Dunkin'
111. Id. at 96,690.
112. See Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd,
531 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 74 (1976).
113. See note 66 supra.
114. 68 F.R.D. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1975), reo'd 531 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct.
74 (1976).
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Donuts' policy of granting a license to use its trademark only on the
condition that the licensee accept certain other items constituted an
illegal tying arrangement. Specifically, they contended that five
items were illegally tied to the trademark-equipment, 15 supplies," 6
signs,' real estate,"" and advertising."' Most of these alleged tieins had been reduced to contract form in Dunkin' Donuts' franchise
agreements, but were removed in 1970 after Siegel v. Chicken De29
light, Inc.1
held similar contractual requirements per se illegal
under the antitrust laws. Thus plaintiffs did not rely on the terms
of their franchise agreements, but contended that Dunkin' Donuts'
policy of imposing these requirements constituted de facto tying.,
In bringing this suit, plaintiffs sought to represent over 600
present and former Dunkin' Donuts franchisees, and moved for class
action certification under rule 23(b) (3). Defendant, relying upon the
Individual Coercion Doctrine, contended that because individual
proof of coercion was required, certification should be denied due to
115. Plaintiffs contended that Dunkin' Donuts made it a condition of purchasing a
franchise that the franchisee buy from or through Dunkin' Donuts the equipment necessary
to operate the franchisee's store. Prior to 1970 the standard franchise agreement required
franchisees to purchase the equipment package solely from Dunkin' Donuts at an allegedly
inflated price. Although the franchise agreement was amended in 1970 to grant franchisees a
30-day option to purchase elsewhere, plaintiffs asserted that the 30-day period was insufficient and that Dunkin' Donuts still extrinsically pressured franchisees not to purchase elsewhere, such that the pre-1970 policy was being effectively continued. 68 F.R.D. at 80-81.
116. The post-1966 franchise agreement required franchisees to purchase flour, shortening, fillings, paper products, and coffee either from "approved" vendors or from
"nonapproved" vendors who could meet Dunkin' Donuts' specifications. Plaintiffs contended
that again defendant exerted pressure on franchisees to purchase only from selected vendors
by threats of disenfranchisement and other obfuscatory methods in order to facilitate illegal
kickbacks. Id. at 81-82.
117. Dunkin' Donuts had maintained a policy that each franchisee locate certain signs
in his store. Plaintiffs claimed that defendant subtly coerced franchisees to purchase the signs
from selected vendors. Id. at 82.
118. Plaintiffs complained that Dunkin' Donuts conditioned the grant of a franchise
upon the franchisee's agreement to lease or sublease his premises from Dunkin' Donuts at a
substantial markup. Id.
119. The Dunkin' Donuts franchise agreement required franchisees to pay 2% of their
gross sales into an "Advertising and Sales Promotion Fund" to be disbursed by Dunkin'
Donuts. In addition to common law claims, plaintiffs argued that these contributions constituted a tying arrangement under which defendant tied its advertising program to the franchise name and license. Id. at 82-83.
120. 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal. 1967), modified sub nom., Chicken Delight, Inc. v.
Harris, 412 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1969), on modification, 311 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955
(1972); see text accompanying note 85 supra.
121. 531 F.2d at 1214-16. Tying arrangements can be proven not only by evidence of
an express agreement but also through conduct extrinsic to an agreement. Advance Business
Systems & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920
(1970); see note 61 supra and accompanying text.
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the resultant predominance of individual questions. Plaintiffs, however, asserted that no such individual coercion requirement exists
in the law of tying and, alternatively, that even if there is such a
requirement, common questions still predominated because of the
persuasive effect of defendant's policies in franchise dealings.'
Therefore, the case presented to the district court was one that,
based on precedent, would be expected to result in a routine denial
of class certification.
A.

23

The District Court Decision'

In an extensive seventy-three page opinion the district court
rejected the Individual Coercion Doctrine and permitted plaintiffs'
tying claims to proceed as a class action. The court first made an
in-depth examination of the basic principles of tying law, concentrating on the elements of per se illegality.'24 The court focused
primarily on the requirement of economic power and its modes of
proof,' 25 noting that such power must not merely exist, but also
must be used.' 2 Based on its review, the court perceived the ultimate issue to be
whether it is sufficient under the law of tying that the plaintiffs show the use
of (the requisite) economic power, or whether the plaintiffs must, as defendant
contends, show that the power was used coercively as to each individual in the
putative class.'1

Thus the court set out to resolve whether the Individual Coercion
Doctrine is properly a part of antitrust law.
At the outset, the court declared that the Supreme Court has
never set forth a coercion requirement in tying cases.'28 Recognizing
that the Doctrine arose primarily from Abercrombie, the court proceeded to examine that case. The court first considered FordMotor,
American Manufacturers, and Lah, the cases upon which
Abercrombie relied, and found them unsupportive of the Doctrine,
either because they were distinguishable on their facts or because
they were incorrectly interpreted in A bercrombie.'21 The court then
distinguished Abercrombie itself since that case involved multiple
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

68 F.R.D. at 77-78.
68 F.R.D. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
Id. at 84-94; see Part II supra.
68 F.R.D. at 90-93.
Id. at 97; see notes 23 & 24 supra and accompanying text.
68 F.R.D. at 97.
Id. at 98.
Id. at 99-105; see text accompanying notes 62 & 63 supra.
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disparate franchise agreements.1 0 That fact alone resulted in a predominance of individual issues, according to the Ungar court, and
therefore Abercrombie's broad statement of the Individual Coercion
Doctrine was entirely unnecessary.' 3 '
After indicating these flaws, the district court turned to two
cases that in its view nullified the Doctrine. First, the court discussed FTC v. Texaco, Inc. 132 in which the Supreme Court found a
quasi-tying arrangement to be an unfair method of competition in
violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,1 33 even
in the absence of overt coercive practices. Because Texaco found the
relationship between a dominant franchisor and its franchisees
"inherently coercive," the Ungar court viewed the Individual Coercion Doctrine as fatally undermined. 34' The court then examined
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. InternationalParts Corp.,13 1 in which
the Supreme Court rejected the doctrine of in pari delicto as a
defense to antitrust actions. Since the Court in Perma Life Mufflers
permitted recovery even though plaintiffs had entered willingly into
a tying arrangement, the Ungar court found coercion irrelevant and
declared that Perma Life Mufflers "emasculates the individual
coercion doctrine."' 3 Thus the court reasoned that a "voluntary" tie
1 37
can exist and rejected the coercion requirement.
Based upon this analysis, the court concluded that the proper
focus of a tying claim is whether the requisite economic power has
been used, not whether it has been used coercively. The court then
set out to find the various means by which "use" can be proved. The
court first found that the use of economic power to condition the
availability of products may be presumed from an express contractual tie, as implied by several post-Abercrombie cases.'38 The court
then returned to the question of coercion and declared that although
coercion is not required in every case, it does represent one mode of
proving the required use of economic power. The court recognized,
however, that if proof of coercion is the avenue of attack, a class
action is inappropriate.' 39 Nevertheless, the court discussed two
130. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
131. 68 F.R.D. at 105.
132. 393 U.S. 223 (1968).
133. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (Supp. V 1975); see note 6 supra.
134. For analysis of this rationale, see Part V.A. infra.
135. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
136. 68 F.R.D. at 110. For analysis of this reasoning, see Part V.A. infra.
137. 68 F.R.D. at 111-13.
138. See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
139. 68 F.R.D. at 114-15.
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other methods of showing "use" that are applicable to class actions.
First, relying on In re Clark Oil & Refining,4 ' the court found that
the requisite use of economic power may be established by evidence
of a "firm and resolutely enforced" policy to influence buyers to
purchase from the seller or its designated sources. The court further
found that a policy merely to persuade is sufficient to show the
requisite use because under Texaco influence or persuasion is the
virtual equivalent of coercion when an unequal relationship between
the parties exists."' Relying upon Judge McLaren's initial ruling in
McMackin, 4 ' the court next stated that "use" also can be inferred
from the acceptance by large numbers of buyers of a burdensome
1 43
or uneconomic tie.
Finally, the court examined the instant facts and found sufficient evidence to create two issues for trial: first, whether Dunkin'
Donuts had engaged in an enforced company policy to impose tying
arrangements; and secondly whether an appreciable number of
franchisees had accepted burdensome tie-ins. Because it found both
issues to involve a predominance of common question, the court
certified plaintiffs' class with respect to the tying claims. 44'
B.

Response to the District Court Decision

Ungar evoked mixed reactions. The first response came within
two weeks when a similar ruling was handed down in Sommers v.
Abraham Lincoln FederalSavings & Loan Ass'n.,1 45 in which plaintiffs alleged a number of tie-ins centering around grants of mortgages. The court realized that if coercion were an element of tying
law, individual questions would predominate, but agreed with
Ungar that coercion is merely one means of proving the use of economic power. The court further agreed that a class action may proceed if there is a prima facie showing of a uniform policy by defendant of enforcing the tie. Finding that the present plaintiffs had
made such a showing with respect to one tying claim, the court
certified the class.146 The court, however, did veer away from Ungar
in one respect. Although Ungar declared that evidence of acceptance of a tie-in by an appreciable number of buyers could prove
140. See notes 100-02 supra and accompanying text.
141. 68 F.R.D. at 113, 115.
142. See notes 105-09 supra and accompanying text.
143. 68 F.R.D. at 115-16.
144. Id. at 141-44, 150.
145. 66 F.R.D. 581 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
146. Id. at 591.
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"use," the Sommers court felt that this issue raised more individual
than common questions." '
The next case to consider the Individual Coercion Doctrine rejected the Ungar approach. The court in Plekowski v. Ralston Purina Co.'4 ' initially noted that Ungar stood against the clear weight
of authority and declared that the Individual Coercion Doctrine was
plainly "on the ascendancy." The court argued that coercion remains a requirement of tying law because it is necessary in proving
causation.' 4 '
Considering the controversy surrounding Ungar, the court in
Stavrides v. Mellon Bank' 0 avoided an explicit holding on the individual coercion issue by certifying the class before it under rule
23(b)(2) instead of 23(b)(3).'' The court nevertheless noted that a
class action would be improper if proof of individual coercion were
required. The court recognized that Ungar had been followed in
Sommers, but realized the Ungar was at that time on appeal to the
Third Circuit and could be overturned. It also noted that Ungarhad
52
been repudiated in Plekowski.1
A more recent case, AAMCO Automatic Transmissions,Inc. v.
Tayloe,'5 3 vindicated Ungar, although the case involved a single
plaintiff rather than a class action. Contrary to defendant's assertion, the court held that coercion as such is not a prerequisite to
liability, but is implicit in two other elements of a tying arrangement-a sale on condition and economic power in the seller. The
court recognized the existence of the cases establishing a coercion
requirement but distinguished them because those cases did not
involve sales on condition.'54
Thus, despite the district court's landmark opinion in Ungar,
the status of the Individual Coercion Doctrine remained uncertain
since the decision met with both acceptance and disapproval. Consequently, final resolution of the status of the Individual Coercion
Doctrine awaited Ungar's appeal to the Third Circuit.
147. Id. The court limited this reasoning to the instant case, finding the discovery
before it to raise a predominance of individual questions.
148. 68 F.R.D. 443 (M.D. Ga. 1975); see notes 81-83 supra and accompanying text.
149. 68 F.R.D. at 451. The court based its causation argument on Zenith Radio Corp.
v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969). Id. at 450.
150. 69 F.R.D. 424 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
151. Id. at 435.
152. Id. at 432-33.
153. 407 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
154. Id. at 435.
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The Court of Appeals Decision'55

On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the district court's holding and determined that class certification was improperly granted.
The court expressed- shock at the district court's statement that the
Supreme Court had not set forth a coercion requirement, finding
that the concept of coercion had been expressed often in cases such
as Northern Pacific,'56 Times-Picayune," and Loew's. 11 Furthermore the court argued that nothing in Texaco or Perma Life
Mufflers militates to the contrary. First, the court contended that
as a FTCA § 5 case, Texaco is wholly inapplicable to a Sherman Act
§ 1 tying suit."9 Secondly, it averred that Perma Life Mufflers does
not negate the coercion requirement since, in that case, plaintiffs
willingly, although involuntarily, participated in the illegal activ-

ity.1 60

The court then turned to the question whether coercion must
be proved individually. It answered affirmatively, reasoning that
[w]hat is sufficient to coerce one buyer's choice may not be sufficient to
coerce another buyer's choice; an item that one buyer might accept voluntarily, another might accept only if forced to do so. The expressions "coercion"
and "individual coercion", in our view, reflect different perspectives on the
same phenomenon. 1 '

The court therefore held that each plaintiff not relying on express
contractual tie-ins must prove that his purchases were coerced in
order to establish unlawful tying. This holding resulted in a predominance of individual questions of law and fact, and therefore, the
62
court denied class certification.
D. Response to the Court of Appeals Decision
The Third Circuit's holding in Ungarhas met with a mixed, but
generally favorable, reaction. A recent case, Response of Carolina,
Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc.," 3 cited Ungarwith approval. Examining the Supreme Court cases relied upon by Ungar,the court agreed
that in all tying cases the buyer must show that he was coerced into
purchasing an unwanted product. The Third Circuit's Ungar deci155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

531 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1976).
See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 31 & 32 supra and accompanying text.
See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
531 F.2d at 1219-21; see Part V.A. infra.
531 F.2d at 1221-22; see Part V.A. infra.
531 F.2d at 1219.
Id. at 1226.
537 F.2d 1307, 1327 (5th Cir. 1976).
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sion also has evoked a favorable response from its first analysis by
a commentator, who concurred in its finding that coercion is a nec6 4 Two cases,
essary element of the law of tying."
however, have cast
doubt on Ungar's viability. The court in Molinas v. Amerada Hess
Corp.'6"found that the Second Circuit's determination in Hill v. AT-O, Inc. that coercion could be established by proof of an overall
policy of tying seriously undermined the authority of Ungar. A very
recent Ninth Circuit case, Moore v. Jas.H. Matthews & Co., 6' also
criticized the Third Circuit's opinion on the ground that Moore's
reading of the Supreme Court cases indicated that coercion may be
implied from a showing of an onerous effect on an appreciable number of buyers. Significantly, Moore raises the specter of a circuit
split on the question of individual coercion. Nevertheless, on October 5, 1976, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Ungar.'
V.

LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE DOCTRINE

Although the Third Circuit's ruling in Ungar and the Supreme
Court's subsequent denial of certiorari apparently have gone far in
confirming the Individual Coercion Doctrine as a principle of antitrust law, its legitimacy remains subject to considerable doubt. The
establishment of a coercion requirement, the phenomenon from
which the Doctrine sprung, might be inconsistent with the basic
principles of tying law enunicated by the Supreme Court. This coercion requirement also may be based upon a misinterpretation of the
precedents it cites for support, and it appears to overlook the
Court's holdings in a pair of other cases. Thus a legal analysis is in
order to point out the Doctrine's serious, and perhaps fatal, flaws.
A.

PrecedentialSupport for the Doctrine

The development of the Individual Coercion Doctrine indicates
that it draws much of its sustenance from early cases in which the
Supreme Court used language connoting coercion in describing
tying arrangements.6 8 Subsequent courts have interpreted this language as setting forth a requirement in all tying cases that in order
to establish an illegal tie, a plaintiff must prove that he was subjectively coerced, not merely persuaded, into purchasing the products
164. Varner, Voluntar, Ties and the Sherman Act, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 271 (1977).
165. 11976-21 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 61,069, at 68,819 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1976).
166. 550 F.2d 1207 (9th Cir. 1977).
167. 45 U.S.L.W. 3250 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1976).
168. See text accompanying notes 30-34 supra.
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at issue.' 9 Examination of these Supreme Court precedents, however, reveals that they do not imply such a requirement, and that
in fact the state of mind of a purchaser is wholly irrelevant in tying
law.
In Northern Pacific the Court defined a tie-in as a conditional
sale, 7 ' observing that no tying problem is raised when a purchaser
is free to take products by themselves. 171 Significantly, the court did
not mention coercion in this definition. In Times-Picayune the
Court did refer to the concept of coercion in noting that "[b]y
conditioninghis sale of one commodity on the purchase of another,
7
a seller coerces the abdication of buyers' independent judgment.'
It is clear from these cases, however, that the existence of a tie-in
restraint is established simply by a seller's act of conditioning a sale
of his products. Instead of finding coercion to be another prerequisite to a tie, the Court stated only that an act of conditioning implicitly causes coercion. Even the Loew's Court's reference to the unwanted nature of tied products 73 meant only that these products are
undesirable solely because of their forced purchase. Thus the courts
imposing the requirement of subjective coercion erroneously have
given an independent viability to the concept by confusing coercion
and conditioning. By inverted logic these courts have reasoned that
in order to establish an illegal tie a plaintiff must show both the act
of conditioning and that he was affected by the conditioning in a
certain way. In referring to the idea of coercion, however, the Supreme Court did not intend that it be a separate element of a tie-in
beyond the showing of conditioning. Instead, the Court described
7
coercion as the necessary effect or by-product of conditioning.
This conclusion is bolstered by the Supreme Court's quite explicit pronouncements on the requisites of per se illegality for tying
arrangements-separate tying and tied products, sufficient economic power, and a substantial effect on commerce.7 5 The coercion
requirement appears to have been aimed at the situation in which
one seller conditions the sale of a tied item but other sellers do not,
169. See, e.g., Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1218-19 (3d
Cir. 1976); American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. ABC-Paramount Theatres, Inc., 446 F.2d 1131,
1137 (2d Cir. 1971); Abercrombie v. Lum's Inc., 345 F. Supp. 387, 391 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
170. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
171. 356 U.S. at 6 n.4.
172. 345 U.S. at 605; see text accompanying note 31 supra.
173. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
174. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit at 11, Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., No. 75-1636, cert. denied, 45
U.S.L.W. 3250 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Petition for Certiorari].
175. See Part II supra.
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in order to preclude a purchaser from treble damage recovery when
he had readily available alternatives.17 Significantly, however, the
requirement of economic power in the seller already presumes the
coercion that this requirement demands. In Northern Pacific, for
example, the Court explained that the reason for requiring economic
control in the tying product is that control is the means of coercion
since it leaves the buyer with no reasonable alternative for obtaining
the product.'77 Or as one commentator has stated,
the existence of leverage implies the power to coerce, and the power to coerce,
assuming rational behavior in the market, exists only when the seller has
leverage in the market of the tying product.'

Thus, once a plaintiff can show a defendant's economic power in the
tying product to be sufficient under the standards of per se illegality, coercion should be assumed.
The role of coercion in the scheme of tying law therefore becomes clear. The mere existence of a tie-in is established by proof
that the seller used his economic power to condition the availability
of the tying product on the purchase of the tied product.' Coercion
is irrelevant at this stage because the tie is not yet illegal. Once the
other elements of per se unreasonableness are established, however,
the tying arrangement is illegal, and coercion is presumed from the
existence of the requisite economic power. Thus, even if coercion is
a necessary facet of an illegal tying arrangement, it is automatically
present when all the other elements are present. 8" This conclusion
seems inescapable when it is considered that had the Court intended coercion to be an independent requirement for per se illegality, it would have expressly so provided.
The Individual Coercion Doctrine also depends in part on the
Supreme Court's opinion in Ford Motor, which reads the Doctrine
as requiring coercion for general antitrust liability as well as tying
liability. This reliance, however, is equally misplaced. In Ford
176. See Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 7 (1958). The commentator
approving of the Third Circuit's holding in Ungar agrees with this rationale. Varner, supra
note 164, at 279.
177. The Court reasoned that:
Of course where the seller has no control or dominance over the tying product so that it
does not represent an effectual weapon to pressure buyers into taking the tied item any
restraint of trade attributable to such tying arrangements would obviously be insignificant at most.
356 U.S. at 6.
178. Comment, supra note 1, at 857 n.74.
179. See notes 23 & 24 supra and accompanying text; Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of
America, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 65, 97 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
180. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 174, at 13; Comment, supra note 14, at 229.
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Motor, the Court distinguished between the concepts of
"persuasion" and "coercion,"" '' and the Abercrombie court interpreted that distinction to mean that in order to establish a tie-in,
purchasers must prove that they were coerced, not merely persuaded, into purchasing the tied product. 8 2 Yet Ford Motor is not
a tying case, and in fact, the holding is expressly limited to its very
narrow fact situation. The Court's distinction between coercion and
persuasion was no more than a means of construing the consent
decree between Ford and the Government and certainly was not
intended to state a substantive requirement of the antitrust laws. 83
Therefore, not only do the cases cited in support of the Individual Coercion Doctrine fail to establish a coercion requirement for all
tying cases, they actually militate against such a requirement. Even
though these cases standing alone invalidate the Doctrine, further
evidence that a subjective coercion requirement has no place in
tying law is found in the Supreme Court's decisions in Perma Life
Mufflers, Inc. v. InternationalParts Corp.'84 and FTC v. Texaco,

Inc. 185
B.

The Effect of Perma Life Mufflers

In Perma Life Mufflers, plaintiff Midas Muffler dealers complained that Midas's sales agreements imposed several restraints of
trade, including tying the sale of its mufflers to the sale of other
products in the Midas line and barring the dealers from purchasing
from other sources.' The court of appeals affirmed summary judgment for defendant under the doctrine of in pari delicto, holding
plaintiffs equally at fault because they had "participated" in the
restraint. The court based this finding on its observation that plaintiffs had enthusiastically sought to acquire Midas franchises with
full knowledge of the challenged contract provisions, and that they
had reaped great profits as Midas dealers. 187 The Supreme Court
reversed, however, and rejected the in pari delicto doctrine as a
defense to an antitrust action. In a persuasive passage the Court
observed that the state of mind of a purchaser is irrelevant once the
tying condition is established:
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

See notes 25-29 supra and accompanying text.
See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
See Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 65, 102 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
392 U.S. 134 (1968).
393 U.S. 223 (1968).
392 U.S. at 137. Plaintiffs also alleged price-fixing and territorial restrictions.
Id. at 137-38.
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Moreover, even if petitioners actually favored and supported some of the other
restrictions, they cannot be blamed for seeking to minimize the disadvantages
of the agreement once they had been forced to accept its more onerous terms
as a condition of doing business.""

The Court then reasoned that once a plaintiff shows that he has not
aggressively furthered a restraint of trade, his mere willing participation is not grounds for denying recovery." 9 Thus Perma Life
Mufflers establishes that the voluntary acquiescence of a purchaser
in a tying arrangement will not preclude its successful challenge.
Equally probative in Perma Life Mufflers is Justice White's
concurrence, in which he found that the deterrent aims of the antitrust laws outweighed the desirability of preventing recovery by
plaintiffs who participate in illegal restraints. Therefore, he argued,
[wihen those with market power and leverage persuade, coerce, or influence
others to cooperate in an illegal combination to their damage, allowing recovery to the latter is wholly consistent with the purpose of [the antitrust laws],
since it will deter those most likely to be responsible for organizing forbidden
schemes. "'

Justice White's statement implies that once a defendant possesses
sufficient market power, a tying arrangement can be achieved even
by persuasion or influence. The inclusion of these methods certainly
indicates that coercion is not the only means of establishing an
illegal tie. 1 ' This conclusion is even more persuasive in light of
Texaco.
C. The Effect of Texaco
In FTC v. Texaco, Inc.12 the Federal Trade Commission proceeded against Texaco under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,'93 challenging Texaco's sales commission agreements
with B.F. Goodrich Co. to sponsor its tires, batteries, and accessories (TBA) that were to be carried by Texaco dealers. The FTC
determined that because of the leverage Texaco enjoyed over its
dealers, its attempts to influence them to enter the arrangement
constituted an unfair method of competition under section 5. The
court of appeals, however, set aside the FTC's cease and desist order
because Texaco had not "exercised" its dominant power.'94 The
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 139-40.
Id.
Id. at 145 (White, J., concurring).
See Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 65, 111 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
393 U.S. 223 (1968).
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970); see note 6 supra.
383 F.2d 942 (D.C. Cir. 1967). The court of appeals relied upon the Supreme
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Supreme Court reversed, finding a section 5 violation even in the
absence of overt coercive practices because the dominant position
of Texaco over its dealers rendered the sales-commission marketing
system "inherently coercive."' 95 The Court therefore concluded that
merely by attempting to influence its dealers to purchase Goodrich
TBA, Texaco had used its economic power in a manner tending to
foreclose competition.' 5
Although Texaco arose under section 5 and thus is not a true
tying case, its rationale is instructive.1 7 The Supreme Court inferred
inherent coercion from Texaco's dominant market position and
found that the resulting disparity in bargaining power rendered evidence of mere persuasion or influence sufficient to prove illegality.
Carried over to the tying context, dominance exists by virtue of a
seller's economic power in the tying product. Therefore, logic implies that if coercion is to be presumed from a seller's economic
power, overt coercion need not be shown.' 95
D.

The Use of Economic Power

This analysis concludes that a coercion requirement is not
properly an element of tying law. When a purchaser enters into a
tying arrangement, whether or not he does so voluntarily, he should
be able to obtain recovery under the antitrust laws if he can show
that the seller possessed the required economic power and used
that power to condition the sale of his products.'99 This revelation
demonstrates how the cases formulating the coercion requirement
Court's earlier decision in Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965), a similar TBA
case in which there were found a number of clearly coercive practices.
195. 393 U.S. at 229. The Court reasoned that
[wlith the dealer's supply of gasoline, his lease on his station, and his Texaco identification subject to continuing review, we think it flies in the face of common sense to say,
as Texaco asserts, that the dealer is "perfectly free" to reject Texaco's chosen brand of
TBA.
Id.
196. 393 U.S. at 228-29.
197. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act is broader in its coverage than the
other antitrust statutes, permitting the FTC to challenge practices that seem harmful or
potentially harmful to competition, whether or not they actually violate the antitrust laws.
Furthermore, in general, judicial deference is given to the FTC's determinations under § 5.
See P. AREEDA, ANTrrRUST ANALYsIS 158, at 63 (2d ed. 1974).
198. One case, however, has rejected such reasoning. Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d
175 (10th Cir. 1972), a similar TBA case, distinguished FTC v. Texaco, Inc., as a § 5 case,
and read it as not having found the sales commission arrangement to have constituted a tiein violating Sherman Act § 1. One commentator has soundly criticized Belliston, arguing that
the Texaco Court had found the arrangement to be a tie-in, but did not so hold only because
it was a § 5 proceeding. Solomon, supra note 24, at 574.
199. See Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 65, 114 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
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erred. In American Manufacturers the court held that plaintiff
could not have been "coerced" because it had accepted sponsorship
over unwanted stations merely as a bargaining strategy.01 The
court's statement that no tie-in can exist unless "coercion influences the buyer's choice" was irrelevant to such a holding, however,
since "bargaining strategy" implies only that no condition was ever
placed on the sponsorships."0 ' Similarly, in Capital Temporariesthe
court found no coercion because the challenged contract did not
require plaintiff to operate a "blue collar" business, but merely gave
him an option to do so. 20 2 The court went too far, however, in con-

cluding that plaintiff could not show that he was the "unwilling
purchaser of the tied product" because the fact that the contract
gave him an option meant only that no condition existed."3 Thus,
in cases in which there were no tying arrangements because of the
absence of conditioning, the courts confused this absence with the
resulting lack of coercion.
Given the conclusion that the proper focus of a tying suit is
whether the defendant has used his economic power to condition the
availability of the tying product on the purchase of the tied product,
the question becomes by what methods "use" can be proved. In this
regard the district court opinion in Ungar is especially instructive,
for it states four such means. First, the most flagrant form of tying
is the express contractual tie, and the mere existence of such an
agreement should adequately prove the use of economic power.
Even courts positing the Individual Coercion Doctrine have recognized that contract clauses can automatically constitute tie-ins,
arguing that they raise a presumption of coercion.2"4 As the Ungar
court correctly pointed out, however, the required act of conditioning, not coercion, should be presumed from an express contractual
tie.20 5 Also, if uniformity in challenged contract clauses is sufficiently great, class action treatment obviously is appropriate under
this method of proof because of the predominance of this common
issue. Secondly, Ungar recognized that proof of actual subjective
coercion should be sufficient to establish that a seller in fact conditioned the sale of his products since a purchaser certainly would not
200.
201.
Pa. 1976);
202.
203.
Pa. 1976);
204.
205.

See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
See AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc. v. Tayloe, 407 F. Supp. 430, 435 (E.D.
Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc. 68 F.R.D. 65, 103 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
See AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc. v. Tayloe, 407 F. Supp. 430, 435 (E.D.
Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 65, 106 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
See notes 75 & 85-88 supra and accompanying text.
68 F.R.D. at 114.
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otherwise feel compelled to accept an unwanted item. As the Individual Coercion Doctrine holds, however, proof of subjective coercion necessarily raises a predominance of individual issues, and
therefore, class action certification is improper if this is the mode
of proof.
The district court in Ungar also suggested two more novel
means by which "use" can be proved. The court first reasoned that
a tie-in can be established simply by proof that the defendant seller
pursued a policy of imposing tying arrangements, 2 6 and this independent analysis yields a similar conclusion. A commentator has
noted that in determining whether a purchaser can buy a tying
product only on the condition that he take a tied product, no difficulty is present where the condition is express. This commentator
has observed, however, that in some cases the substance of a condition may exist even if the form does not. 20 1 The general policy to tie
is just such a case since a pervasive practice of tying is almost the
equivalent of widespread imposition of contractual ties. Any other
conclusion would raise form over substance. 2 8 Furthermore, as the
Ungar district court found, this unlawful policy need not be restricted to the attempt to expressly condition sales; rather, in light
of Texaco, a policy merely to influence or persuade may suffice
where the seller's dominance effectively conditions the availability
of his products. 29 Because proof of an overall policy to tie is a common question, a class action is especially suitable to this means of
establishing "use." Finally, the Ungar court stated a fourth mode
of proof-evidence that a large number of buyers has accepted an
uneconomic tie. 211 Quite clearly this method of proving "use" makes
practical sense because the presence of an appreciable number of
burdensome tying arrangements in the market raises the inference
that the seller actively has taken advantage of his economic power.
Since proof of this phenomenon also raises a single common question, class action treatment is proper.
VI.

POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE DOCTRINE

Equally important to a study of the Individual Coercion Doctrine is an analysis of its relationship to antitrust policy, and once
again its legitimacy is open to question. First, demanding that a
206. Id. at 115.
207. Pearson, supra note 1, at 630.
208. 68 F.R.D. at 113.
209. Id. at 115.
210. Id. at 115-16.
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purchaser prove that he was personally influenced by a seller's activities may violate the most basic purposes behind the ban on tying
arrangements. Secondly, because requiring individual proof of coercion forestalls class actions in this context, the Doctrine inhibits
private enforcement of the antitrust laws. Closer scrutiny of these
aspects of the Doctrine lead to the inevitable conclusion that it
should be invalidated.
A.

Antitrust Policy and the Coercion Requirement

Initially an independent coercion requirement appears consistent with the policies behind the prohibition of tying arrangements.
The Supreme Court often has denounced these restraints because
they compel buyers to sacrifice alternatives and purchase unwanted
products or services at inflated prices."' Under this rationale a coercion requirement makes practical sense because it prevents the
windfall award of treble damages to those buyers whose purchasing
decisions were made freely and who thus were not injured by the
seller's practices. 1 2 Furthermore, demanding a showing of subjective coercion from the buyer insulates the seller from liability for
what may constitute no more than aggressive persuasion or salesmanship.2 1 3 This is especially true in the franchise context in which
dominant franchisors often wish to persuade franchisees to buy their
products and the franchisees are often more than willing to obtain
a package of the items necessary to operate the business.2 14 Thus
were tying law formulated solely to protect buyers, a coercion requirement would be desirable.1 5
Beyond the buyer-seller relationship, however, the Supreme
Court has evinced equal, and perhaps greater, concern for the interests of competing sellers in free access to the market since tying
arrangements by their very nature foreclose competition in the tied
product. ' As Professor Turner observes, the fact that a seller's
211. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958); Times-Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953); see text accompanying note 4
supra.
212. See Brief for Appellants at 30-31, Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 531
F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1976).
213. See Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1226 (3d Cir. 1976).
214. Id. at 1224. One commentator has argued that courts should avoid the overzealous
invalidation of tie-ins in the franchise context, because vertical integration and an end to the

advantages of franchising may result. Thus courts should balance the coercive effect of tying
arrangements against the benefits derived by franchisees from this form of doing business.
See Comment, supra note 1, at 875.
215. See Turner, supra note 1, at 60.
216. See, e.g., Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503
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economic power over a tying product may be so slight that buyers
are not in fact "coerced" does not lessen the adverse impact on
competing sellers.2 '7 In summarizing the law of tying Justice White
also has recognized this feature:
even if the customer is indifferent among brands of the [tied] product and
therefore loses nothing by agreeing to use the seller's brand of the [tied]
product in order to get his brand of the [tying product], such tying arrangements may work significant restraints on competition in the tied product.11

Thus it is not surprising that in Fortnerthe Supreme Court recognized that because tying arrangements generally serve no useful
purpose beyond the suppression of competition, the mere presence
of an appreciable restraint on competition alone is sufficient to invalidate a tie.2t 9
The Court's increasing concern with foreclosed competitors is
perhaps best represented by its trend toward diminishing the
amount of economic power necessary to establish an illegal tie. The
Court clearly has retreated from its early demand for market dominance to a standard under which sufficient economic power can be
inferred almost from the very existence of a tying arrangement.2
One commentator has argued that this trend represents a distinct
move toward characterizing tying arrangements as per se illegal in
all cases where an appreciable amount of commerce is affected.2 2 ' If
this is true, there exists no logical justification for a coercion requirement that would ratify a serious restraint of trade simply because a
buyer was not adversely influenced by a tie. The coercion requirement therefore should be dispensed with.
B. Antitrust Policy and the Individual Coercion Requirement
Necessitating individual proof of coercion is equally repugnant
(1969); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958); Times-Picayune Publishing
Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605, 611 (1953); see text accompanying note 4 supra.
217. Turner, supra note 1, at 60-61. In a footnote the Third Circuit in Ungar attempted
to distinguish between purchasers and competing sellers, and although it expressly reserved
its opinion on whether a competing seller might have to prove actual coercion of the purchaser, the court indicated that the seller might not. 531 F.2d at 1221 n.7a. Such a distinction
does not salvage the Individual Coercion Doctrine, however, since competing sellers are much
less likely to suffer significant loss and therefore in most instances will not find it economically feasible to bring an action against a tying seller. Thus the private action by the purchaser remains necessary to vindicate the rights of competing sellers.
218. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 512-13 (1969)
(White, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 503.
220. See text accompanying notes 21 & 22 supra.
221. Austin, supra note 1, at 109.
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to antitrust policy because it inhibits private enforcement of the
antitrust laws. Among the various means of implementing the antitrust laws, the Supreme Court has characterized private treble
damage actions as a "bulwark of antitrust enforcement" because
they represent a constant deterrent to antitrust violations.22 The
Court's concern goes beyond the particular plaintiff, for as it has
noted, private antitrust litigation is encouraged not only to compensate those who have been injured directly, but also to vindicate the
public's interest in free competition.rs Consequently, a number of
Court decisions have enhanced the feasibility of maintaining private actions, 2 4 causing a boom in treble damage litigation.225 Class
actions particularly have been regarded as a major vehicle of antitrust enforcement. 228 As the Supreme Court observed in Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co.,27 class actions facilitate private actions "by permitting citizens to combine their limited resources to achieve a more
powerful litigation posture." These efficiencies are even more prominent in tying cases, in which almost by definition a plaintiff purchaser is confronted by a more economically powerful seller and in
which the plaintiff must provide rather extensive market data.
Thus, because inhibition of class action tying suits most likely
would deter the instigation of single-plaintiff suits, class actions
should be facilitated in this area.
The Individual Coercion Doctrine, however, effectively precludes class actions. The courts following the Doctrine almost automatically have found that the necessary showing of subjective coercion on an individual basis creates a predominance of individual
questions so that rule 23(b)(3) is unavailable. 228 Although these
222.
223.
224.

Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968).
Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502 (1969).
See, e.g., Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 487-88

(1968) (limiting the "passing-on" defense); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts
Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 135-40 (rejecting the in pari delicto defense); Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) (disfavoring the use of summary judgments in

antitrust actions); Bohling, Franchise Terminations Under the Sherman Act: Populism and
Relational Power, 53 TEXAS L. REv. 1180, 1200-01 (1975).

225.

For example, during the first 50 years of the Sherman Act, only 175 written court

opinions existed in private litgation; in the year ending June 1973, a total of 1,152 private
suits were brought in federal courts. PanelDiscussion:PrivateActions-The Purposes Sought
and the Results Achieved, 43 ANTITRUST L.J. 73, 77 (1973) (remarks of Mr. Millstein).
226. For a discussion of class actions in the antitrust context, see Note, Litigating the
Antitrust Conspiracy Under Amended Rule 23: Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., and School
District v. Harper & Row Publishers,Inc., 54 VA. L. REv. 314 (1968).
227. 405 U.S. 251, 266 (1972). See also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 186
(1974) (Douglas, J., concurring & dissenting) (quoting N.Y.L.J., May 2, 1972, at 4, col. 3);
Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 484, 493-94 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
228. See text accompanying note 66 supra.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:755

cases generally recognize that a class action can be maintained
when the alleged tie-in is reduced to a specific contract clause,", all
a seller need do to insulate himself from class action attack is remove the offensive language while retaining his tying policy.u Not
only is such a dichotomy legally unsound, it clearly contravenes the
policies of both rule 23 and the antitrust laws. Perhaps.the Doctrine
has arisen in part because of the current hostility of the courts to
class actions. 3 ' Such actions should not be precluded, however,
when they are clearly necessary, nor should such a subjective attitude by the courts dictate substantive antitrust law. Thus the Individual Coercion Doctrine should be abolished if only to foster class
actions in the tying area.
VII.

CONCLUSION

At the present time the Individual Coercion Doctrine appears
strengthened by the Third Circuit's ruling in Ungar and the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in that case. Nevertheless, detailed analysis of the Doctrine demonstrates that despite the Doctrine's rather lengthy development, it is inconsistent with the basic
legal principles of the law of tying as well as the more general purposes of the antitrust laws. The courts should again undertake a
critical analysis of the Doctrine and, as the district court did in
Ungar,remove coercion as an independent requirement of tying law.
Perhaps in the near future as a result of the present split in the
circuit courts of appeals, the Supreme Court itself will make a definitive statement on this controversial issue and set forth the proper
role of coercion in antitrust law.
W.
229. See part llI.D.(2) supra.
230. See Petition for Certiorari, supra note 174, at 23.
231. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
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